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DECONSTRUCTING EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY?
FERNANDO
CANALE
Andrews University
Probably most evangelical theologians would be more inclined to defend,
expand, and disseminate their theologd convictions than to deconstruct them.
The notion that their theology could be "deconstructed" may sound, to them,
preposterous, even sacrilegous. As a methodologd step, however,
deconstruction is always necessary to understand revealed truths. In our
postmodern times, "deconstruction" has become a synonym for "destruction."
However, as I will explain later, in h s article I will use the word
"deconstruction" to name a critical method of analyzing and evaluating the
presuppositions on which theological systems have been built. Though the
deconstruction may be applied to all schools of Christian theology, in this
article I will specifically apply it to evangelical theology.
This article suggests the possibility of analyzing evangelical theology'
critically by deconstructing the theological system on which it stands. Though
deconstruction can be applied to biblical interpretation and pastoral practices,
in this article I am focusing on the deconstruction of Christian teachings that
were constructed through the centuries by way of dogmatic or systematic
theological thinking. Instead of facing the ever-increasing fragmentation of
evangelical theology and its lack of relevance in the life of the church: I suggest
we take an honest, introspective look at our own thinking. Thus the aim of
methodological deconstruction is not to destroy evangelical theology, but to
open the way for new theological understandings and fresh discovery of truth.'
This proposal may be especially helpful in a time when evangelical theology is
going through a period of crisis and transition.''
My purpose is modest. I aim at presenting a preliminary outline of the

'Though in this article I discuss the program of theological deconstruction in
concrete relation to American evangelicalism,deconstruction is required in all forms of
evangelical theologies and schools of Christian theologies.
*On the lack of relevance of theology in our times, see, e.g., Millard J. Erickson,
WheretTheolbgyGoing?Issues and Peqbectives on the Future oflbeology (Grand Rapids: Baker,
1991);and David F. Wells, No Phcefor Truth or WhateverHqbpned to Evangebcal Theology?
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).
'For instance, Clark Pinnock is convinced that "there is always a place for asking
questions and for challenging assumptions. Our God-talk is always open to reevaluation because mistakes can be made and need correcting" (MostMoved Mover: A
Theology ofGod3 Openness [Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, 20011, ix).
4Foran introduction to the ongoing crisis and transition in evangelical theology,
see Stanley J. Grenz, Renewing the Center Evangekcal Theohgy in a Post-Theological Era
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 151-183.

main components callmg for theological deconstr~ction.~
To achieve this
objective, we need to consider the postmodern context facing evangelical
theology, the postmodern turn to hermeneutical reason, and the notions of
hermeneutical principles and deconstruction. Then we must consider the
philosophical origin of Christian hermeneutics and the concrete way in which
the classicalhermeneutical traditioninterpreted the hermeneutical foundations
of theology. At this point, we will examine the pivotal axis around which
theological deconstruction revolves. This axis includes the philosophical
deconstruction of the ontology on which Christian theology was constructed,
the hermeneutical alternative that such deconstruction presents to evangelical
theologians, and the forgotten temporal horizon from which biblical thinkers
understood God's being and actions. Finally, from the evangelical affirmation
of the soh, tota, andprima Scriptma principles we will consider the role Scripture
plays in theological deconstruction in general, and specifically in the
deconstruction of classical and modern macro hermeneutics, the Wesleyan
Quadrilateral, and the historical-criticalmethod.
EuangekcalTheology and Postmodernity
We do theology within a historical context. Here I will briefly consider the
immediate intellectualcontext from w i h whch deconstruction as theological
procedure should be understood. Since the last decade of the twentieth century,
our times have been consistently characterized as "postmodern." Although
evangelical theologans consider postmodernism a "challenge," some see it in
a more positive light than other^.^ Here I will refer to postmodernity not from
the apologetical, but from the methodological perspective as the intellectual
environment that facilitates the task of deconstruction.
Some years ago, Hans Kiing realized that the word "postmodernity" is a
label for an "epoch that upon closer inspection proves to have set in decades
ago . . . and is now malung broad inroads into the consciousness of the
masses."' Briefly put, then, we can say that "postmodernity" is a cultural
phenomenon taking place at the intellectual and social levels. Though the social
level permeatingAmerican culture is of great importance for practical theology,
5DeconstructingChristian docttines we have received by way of tradition will not
be possible within the limits of this study.
Under the title "Postconservative Evangelicalism," Gary Domen provides a
survey of recent trends in constructive evangelical theology (TheRemaking ofEvangehcal
Theology [Louisville:WestminsterJohn Knox, 19981,185-209).A number of proposals
on how to face postmodernity may be found in David S. Dockery, ed., The Challenge of
Postmodemism: An Evangehcal Engagement (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995); see also Millard
J. Erickson, Postmodemi*ng the Faith: Evangehcai Responses to the Chaihnge ofPostmodemism
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998); and idem, Truth or Conseq~ences:The Promise and Perilr of
Postmodemism (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001).
'Hans Kiing, Theoh~forthe Third Millennium, trans. Peter Heinegg (New York:
Doubleday, l988), 2.

our proposal naturally connects with the intellectual ground of postmodem
times.'
Among others, French philosopherJean-Fransois Lyotard has influencedthe
evangelicalunderstandingof postmodernism at the intellectual level. Lyotard used
the word "postmodernity" to describe the "condition of knowledge in the most
In a small treatise, he presented postmodernity by
highly developed ~ocieties."~
reporting on the status of scientificknowledge at the end of the twentieth century.
He took the word "postmodernity" from American sociologws and critics, who
used it to designate "the state of our culture following the transformationswhlch,
since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for science,
literature, and the arts."1° We can say, then, that "postmodernity" is the broad
cultural acceptance of the epistemological criticism of reason and the nature of
scientificknowledge that took place during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
So far, however, evangelical theologians have related to postmodernity more as
a sociocultural reality than as an intellectual phenomenon.
When seen from the cultural perspective, postmodernity's main "sin" is
the denial of objective, absolute truth in favor of total scientific and cultural
relativism." Accordmg to Paul Lakeland, postmodernity "is deeply suspicious
of notions of universal reason, and it rejects all metaphysical and religious
foundations, all 'grand theory,' all theoretical systems."'* Not surprisingly, the
postmodem notion that texts are incapable of conveying meaning upsets
biblical theologians.13 Besides, most writers understand postmodernity as a
continuity replacement of modernity. In a hidden way, modernity becomes the
central and foundational formative period in Westem philosophy and theology.
Whatever is
or precriticalI5is belittled. The realization that the
postmodern turn implies a deconstruction of theological constructions based
on premodern and modern ontologies and epistemologies seems to have not
'For an introduction to postmodernity, see Paul Lakeland, Postmodemi& Christan
Identip in aFragmentedAge (Minneapolis:Fortress, 1997);and StanleyJ. Grenz, A Primer
on Postmodemism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996).
'Jean Franqois Lyotard, The Postmodem Condtion:A Report on Knowllpdge, trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Mtnneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1979),xxiii.
1°Ibid.
"David S. Dockery, "The Challenge of Postmodernism," in The Challenge of
Postmodemism:A n E vangeha/ E ngagemenf, ed. David S. Dockery (Grand Rapids: Baker,
1995),14.This implies a revolt against medieval and modern minds (Carl F. H. Henry,
"Postmodernism: The New Spectre?' in The Challenge ofPosfmodemism:A n Evangehca/
Engagement, ed. David S. Dockery [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995],40),the conviction that
relqgon is a private affair (ibid., 41), and the rejection of foundationalism (ibid., 42).
'*Lakeland, xii.
13Henry,36.
'4Erickson,T

d or Conseguences,32-52.

I5AveryDulles, The Craft ofTheoio8:F m J'ymbolfoSysem (New York: Crossroad,
1992), 3-4.
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yet dawned on most evangelical theologians.
Postmodernity affects Christianityin general and the evangelical theological
community in particular for two primary reasons. First, because evangelicals
preach the gospel to the world, any change in the world and its culture directly
relates to its proclamation. If adjustments are not made, the church may find
herself preaching to a nonexistent world. Second, because most theologians
construct their views on the methodological assumption that besides Scripture
other sources of cultural origination must be included, notably philosophy and,
since the Enlightenment, the factual sciences. For instance, the postmodem
reinterpretation of reason affects evangelical theology because during the
twentieth century evangelical apologetics was constructed using the
old-Enhghtenrnent-rules
of the game, which postmodernity has now
changed.16However, the postmodem period is not the first time that philosophy
has changed the rules of the game on Christian theologians. The period of
Enlightenment, or the Modem age, produced the &st epochal change. Much of
Protestantand American evangelicalismcame into existence during the modernist
epoch and did not escape its influence." Thus,in different and unique ways, the
Enltghtenment shaped Fundamentalism, Liberalism, and Neo-Orthodoxy.
Because in his Report on Knowkdge Lyotard only described the status of
scientific knowledge without Qscussing its epistemological and philosophical
causes, postrnodernity appears, to evangelical thinkers, to be another cultural
paradigm shift to whch we have to adjust when preaching and defending the
gospel.'8 In this context, evangelical theologians have reacted to the challenge
of postrnodernity in various ways. Authors attempting to overcome the
epistemological challenge presented by postrnodernity emphasize one comer
of the "Wesleyan Quadrilateral" of theological so~rces.'~
Thus, for instance,
Thomas Oden works from tradition, Stanley Grenz from tradition and
experience, Kelvin Jones from reason, and Millard Erickson from Scripture.
Oden and Grenz have produced the more nuanced proposals to date.
Besides, they have developed systematic approaches to theology in concrete
Their approaches center around and budd upon
dialogue with po~tmodernity.~
'%ee,e.g., Grenz, Pfimer on Posfmodcmi~m,161.
17See,Bernard Ramm, The Evangehcal Heritage: A Sfmj in Historical Theoiog (Grand
Rapids: Baker, 1973),64-101.
I8Forinstance, Grenz affirms that "Postmodernism refers to the intellectual mood
and cultural expression that are becoming increasingly dominant in contemporary
society. We are apparently moving into a new cultural epoch, postrnodernity" (A Ptimcr

on Posfmodcmism, 13).
19Foran introduction to the "Wesleyan Quadrilateral," see Albert C. Outler, The
Weslyan TheologicalHeritage, ed. Thomas C . Oden and Leicester R. Longden (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1991); and Donald A. D. Thorsen, The WesLyan Quau?ibteraL
Scrtpture, Tradfion, Reason and Experience ar a Modcl ofEvangehcal Theology (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1990).
2ThomasC. Oden, Sydematic Theology,3 vols. (San Francisco:Harper & Row, 1987,

tradition. Having been a modernist theologian himself, Oden criticizes
modernity and modem theology, sparing n o words. Accordmg to him, to
overcome modernity we should work "with" but not "within" the postmodern
interpretation of historical reason:' and draw our henneneutical directives from
the consensus of early Christian tradition.22 His proposal then calls for a
"postmodem orthodoxy."23 Grenz builds his approach to a postmodern
evangelical systematic theology on tradition and experience. However, he
emphasizes present tradition as it actually takes place in concrete communities
of faith over the "Grand Tradition" emphasized by Oden, Alister M ~ G r a t h ? ~
and Carl Henry.25A thtrd approach consists in canceling out postmodernity by
reaffirming the objectivity of reason via classical philosophcal thmkhg; at least
h s seems to be the suggestion of Kelvin Jones, who builds on Henry and
Thomas Aquinas, who, in turn, b d t on Aristotle and plat^.^^ A fourth
approach, advanced by Erickson, calls for critical evaluation, adaptation in the
proclamation of the gospel message in order to be understood by postmodern
persons,27 and the need to accelerate the transition from postmodernity to
"postpostmodernity."28 Among several recommendations about how to
accelerate this transition, Erickson suggests that we should become aware of
our philosophical presuppositions and define them not from the philosophical
supermarket as traditionally done, but from Scripture. He explains:
We should seek to discern whether the Bible gives us a
metaphysics, then check against it our own conceptions,
correcting them to fit, then repeating the exegesis, again matching
the results to our philosophy and continuing in this process. It is
like adjusting an automobile compass. One does not attempt to
1989,1992);and Stanley Grenz, Theohgfor the Commmunity ofGod (Nashville: Broadman
& Holrnan, 1994).

**ThomasC. Oden, ed., TheLdving God (New York: Harper and Collins, 1992),375,
391; Kwabena Donkor, Trdtion,Method, and ContenporayProtestant Theohgy:AnAna&is
ofThomas C. Oden's VincentianMethod (Lanham,MD: University Press of America, 2003),
84-87.
2ZThomasC. Oden, Two Worh:Notes on the Death ofModemi0 in America and Russia
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 19W), 53.
23ThomasC. Oden,Agenhfor Theolbgy (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979),30-31.
24AlisterMcGrath, "Engagmg the Great Tradition: Evangelical Theology and the
Role of Tradition," in Evangehca/F&ms:A Conversation on TheologicaMethod,ed. John G.
Stackhouse Jr. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 139-158.
*'Henry, "Postmodernism: The New Spectre?' 50.
%elvin Jones, "The Formal Foundation: Toward an Evangelical Epistemology
in the Postmodern Context," in The ChafhngeofPostmoahi~:A n EvangekcafEngagement,

ed. David S. Dockery (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 344-358.

eliminate the entire directional error in one step. Rather, one
successively heads the car in each of the four primary directions,
each time removing one half of the remaining compass e r r ~ r . ~

The methodologcal, philosophcal, and theological issues involved in this
simple suggestion are momentous. Erickson is saying we should not take
anydung for granted in the area of philosophy. Philosophy changes too often
to be a reliable ally. However, if we check our philosophical ideas from
Scripture, we are defacto reinterpretingthe hermeneutical foundations on which
evangelical and Christian theologies were built. Emotionally, this is not easy to
do because this process involves the deconstruction of evangelical theology that
Erickson probably did not envision when he wrote this ~aragraph.~'
The proposal for deconstructing evangelical theology not only takes place
widun a postmodern intellectual context, but it is also a way to overcome
postmodernity theologdly. Thus to understand theologicaldeconstruction as
methodology, we need to gain an appreciation of the philosophical nature of
the postrnodem turn, to grasp deconstruction as method, to realize that
Christian theologieshave been constructed on philosophical rather than biblical
hermeneutical grounds, and to take heed of Erickson's momentous suggestion
about the philosophical role of Scripture.
The Postmodem Turn: Hemeneutical Reason

Arguably, postmodernity has a sociocultural manifestation and a philosophical
base. While properly addressing postmodernity as cultural phenomenon,
evangelical thought has neglected its philosophical base.31 The generalized
conviction is that something of paradigmatic proportions has shifted in our
291bid.,327.
30Anexample of its difficulty can be found in Richard Lints, The Fabric ofTheohgy: A
Prolegomenon to Evangehal Theolbgy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993). O n one hand, Lints
aftirms the hermeneutical role of the sohS+twaprinciple in today's theology (290-292) and
is convinced that we should relate cultural presuppositions to the principles of rationality
that undergird the gospel (119). O n the other hand, however, he fails to apply the
hermeneutical role of Scripture to the philosophical foundations of Christian theology as
Erickson suggests. This becomes evident when he divides rationality into two kinds,
"cultural" and "native" (118). The former corresponds to the historical rationality of
postmodernism, while the latter corresponds to the classical-modern understanding of
reason as universal and objective. Finally, he grounds native rationality theologically on
Calvin's view of God's nature and actions (125). In so doing, he does not apply the
hermeneutical guidance of Scriptureto the interpretation of reason. He applies a theological
construction built on the hermeneutical guidance of neo-Platonic philosophical notions.
31Thephilosophical causes of postmodernity can be traced back to seventeenthcentury English Empiricism. In the study of nature, empiricism led to the birth of the
modern sciences, scientific positivism, analyticalphilosophy, and contemporary science.
In the study of human beings, empiricism led to historicism, phenomenology,
existentialism, general ontology, and hermeneutics. Familiaritywith these developments
may help us to understand postmodern philosophy.

culture. According to Lyotard's Repod on Know/e&e,we may perceive this "turn"
in the status of scientific tlunkmg.. The so-called "postmodem turn" revolves
around a new interpretation of reason. While modernism limited reason's reach
from timeless to spatiotemporalobjects, postmodernism limited reason's a priori
from timeless-objective to temporal-historical categories. To put it simply, if
modernity was the "age of absolute reason," postrnodernity is the "age of
hermeneutics." As modernity left behind the "pure" reason of classical times,
postmodernity left behind the "absolute-scientificist7'reason of modernity. Thus
we find ourselves operating within the "herrneneutical" reason of
po~tmodernity.~'
Lyotard assumes this change has taken place and reports its results in the
area of science with particular emphasis on the question of legitimation.
"Legitimation" is the process by which a legislator or a scientist may
promulgate a law as the norm for other human beings." Classical and modern
societies achieved legitimation through metaphysics. In the postmodern
conltion, where metaphysics and metanarratives are no longer credible sources
of legitimati0n,3~
"who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs
to be decided?'35 The question, then, is not about objectivity, but about
universahty and authority. In Lyotard's mind, t h s question is connected to the
power some human beings exercise upon others.
Under the influence of Lyotard and Richard Rorty, evangelical theologians
encounter postmodernity as an intellectual phenomenon that revolves around a
reinterpretation of reason. Specifically,postrnodernityis the " t d from absolute
to hermeneutical reason. Yet, what is herrneneutical reason? David Tracy
encapsulated the notion of hermeneutical reason by saying "to understand at all
is to interpret."36To interpret means that not only the object of knowledge but
32ccpUre~,reason is an obvious reference to Kant's criticism of knowledge.
"Scientificist," which was an outcome of Kant's criticism, is a reference to what we
contemporarily refer to as "science," that is, knowledge based on empirical evidence
and experimental methodology.
33Lyotard,8-9.
341bid.,xxiii-XX~V.
351bid.,9.
36DavidTracy, P/uralip and Ambigup: Hermeneutics, Reb@on, Hope (San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1987), 9. The entire quotation is enlightening. "Interpretation seems a
minor matter, but it is not. Every time we act, deliberate, judge, understand, or even
experience, we are interpreting. To understand at all is to interpret. T o act well is to
interpret a situation demanding some action and to interpret a correct strategy for that
action. T o experience in other than a purely passive sense (a sense less than human) is
to interpret; and to be 'experienced' is to have become a good interpreter.
Interpretation is thus a question as unavoidable, finally, as experience, understanding,
deliberation, judgment, decision, and action. To be human is to act reflectively, to
decide deliberately, to understand intelhgently, to experience fully. Whether we know
it or not, to be human is to be a skilled interpreter."

also the cogrudve subject contribute to the formation of knowledge.37If this is
true, to know is to construct. Our knowledge, then, is not passively shaped by
objects (as in realism and positivism), nor is it a projection of our imagmation
(such as in idealism and cultural postmodernity), but results from an interaction
between subject and object. Native to hermeneutical reason is the temporal
hstoricity of the categories it uses for constructing meanings and judgments.
Briefly put, the categories or presuppositions necessary to interpret, evaluate, and
judge are not innate or divinely infused but acquired from experience. That is why
postmodem hermeneutical reason lacks universality, not objectivity. The notion
.~~
that postmodem philosophy calls for unbridled subjectivismis u n ~ a r r a n t e dAt
least the paradigmatic changes in philosophy that took place in the last century do
not point in this direction. Overstatements in this respect might have to be
eventually adjusted.
Acquaintance with the hermeneutical function of the human mind may
help Christian theologians to better understand why their interpretations of the
biblical text and doctxinal constructions conflict and figure out ways to
overcome them.39To understand the postmodern turn we need to introduce
Specifically,we
ourselves to the basic structure of interpreting interpretati~n.~'
need to become aware of the basic principles involved in the act of theological
interpretation.

Hemeneutzcal Principles
Phdosophical hermeneutics originated recently as the phdosophical discipline
dedicated to the investigation of the act of interpretati~n.~'
During the twentieth
century, Hans-Georg Gadamer studted in depth the act of interpretation?' In this
"Nicolai Hartmann, Gmd@ge einermetaphysic &r Erkenntis (Berlin: W .De Gruyter,
1941), 1.5.a.l; cf. 5.1.1.a.
j8Thismisunderstanding and overstatement of postmodernity is properly corrected
by James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Founddonsjr a Creafional
Hemeneutic (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000). Smith, 163, notes that to "say that
everything is interpretation is not to say that all is arbitray. Or, in other words, to
emphasize that understanding is relative to one's situationahty is not to espouse a
rehtivism (which is largely understood as arbitrariness)" (emphasis original).
j9Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "The Pattern of Evangelical Theology: Hornmage A
Ramm," in The Evangekcal Heritage: A St#@ in Historicai Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker,
2000), xiii-xvii. Pinnock, 10-18, uncovers deep divisions within evangelical theology.
"'Smith, 19-25.
41Foran introduction to the notion and origin of hermeneutics as philosophical
discipline, see Raiil Kerbs, "Sobre el desarrollo de la hermenCutica," Anahgia Filoso~ca,
2 (1999): 3-33.
42Hans-GeorgGadamer, TruthandMefhod,trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 1989); see also idem, Philosophical
Hemeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of Caltfornia Press, 1976). Less
known, but equally relevant, is the work of Italian philosopher Emilio Betti,

article, we need only to underline the basic structural fact that interpretation
always flows from presuppositions we bring to bear on what we know or study.
The existence and operation of presuppositions in the act of human knowledge
was already recognized by Plato's notion that to know is to remember. It is the
presence and application of presuppositions in the formation of human
knowledge that makes knowledge an interpretation, or construction. It is
necessary, then, to identify the presuppositions that are always involved when
Christian theologans construct their interpretations and doctrines.
Speakinggenerally, the sum total of the personal experiences we bring to the
act of knowledge can be classified as presuppositions. However, as
presuppositions, not all experiences have the same reach or role. Consequently,
in this study, I will concentrate on a specific group of specialized presuppositions
that I will call "hermeneuticalpresuppositions or principles." They are the general
conditions involved in the interpretation of theologcal data and realities. When
we look at them from the interpretations they helped to create, they appear to us
as "presuppositions." In the task of doing theology, we call them "principles"
because they initiate and condition the entire theological task.
Classical and modem philosophers were convinced that our thinking was
conditioned by a set of hermeneutical principles somehow built into human
nature. To put it simply, as all human beings by nature have, say, a brain, eyes, and
legs, they also have the same hermeneutical principles or presuppositions. While
postrnodernity accepts the presence and role of hermeneutical principles in the
generation of human knowledge, it no longer adjudicates their origin to our
common human nature. On the contrary,hermeneutical principles originate from
temporal-historical experiences, are stored in our minds, and then are used as
parameters to interpret fresh events. If this is so, then we all generate or construct
knowledge from differenceexperiences and, in Christian theology, from different
henneneutical principles. In conclusion, we should not confuse hermeneutical
principles with the sum total of our experience. In Christian theology,
hermeneutical principles or presuppositions dffer from the rest of our cultural
presuppositions because of their broad reach and all-inclusive interpretive
influence.
Briefly put, hermeneutical principles are a tightly interrelated ensemble of
overarching general notions that, because of their all-inclusiveness, condtion
the entire range of Christian -ng.
There are different kinds of
hermeneutical principles, accordmg to the realm to whlch they belong. Thus,
to borrow Kiing's language, we can speak of macro-, meso-, and micro-

in Conteqborq
"Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geistes~misensch~en,"
Hemeneutics: Henncneutics m Method, Phihsoply and Critique, ed. Josef Bleicher (Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); and idem, Teoria Generalk delka Interpreteone (Mdano:
Dott A. Giuffre Editore, 1990).For an introduction to philosophical hermeneutics, see
Josef Bleicher, Conteqboray HemneutjcJ:Hemeneutics m Method, Phihsophy and Critique
(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).

hermeneutical principle^.^^ From macro-hermeneutical principles, which some
theologians draw from philosophy but most assume from tradition, we move
to the meso-hermeneutical principles used to conceive, formulate, and
understand Christian doctrines, and to the micro-hermeneuticalprinciples used
to interpret the text of Scripture. The interpretive force moves from macro- to
micro-hermeneutics. Thus, for instance, when interpreting a text from Paul's
Epistle to the Romans, we apply our macro- and meso-hermeneutical
presuppositions consciously or unconsciously acquired from or belonging to
For this reason, in this article we will
a specific theological traditi~n.~"
concentrate on the interpretation and role of the macro-hermeneutical
principles of theology.
Since theology deals with God, human beings, and creation, theologians
always assume ideas about these realities. Besides, they also presuppose an
interpretation of human reason, including epistemology, hermeneutics,
theological, and exegetical methodologies, and the origin of theological
knowledge (revelation-inspiration). Thus in every biblical interpretation,
theological construction, and practical application, we find the presence and
operation of a few, but very influential, macro-hermeneuticalprinciples. They
are principles about reality, includtng understandmg about Being (general
ontology), God (theology proper), human nature (anthropology), world
(cosmology), and reality as a whole (metaphysics):' and principles about human
knowledge,includmg understandingabout hermeneutics,revelation-inspiration,
and theological method.

Deconstruction as critical method should not be confused or identified with
deconstructionism. Deconstructionism corresponds to what Erickson,
of which
following David Griffin, calls "deconstructive postm~dernism,"~~
Deconstructionism is the constructive
Mark C. Taylor is a fitting e~ample.~'
43Kiing,134,uses the "macro, meso, and micro" categorization to speak about the
scientific paradigm in theology.
T h i s results from the historical structure of our beings, which Gadamer, 294-295,
describes as "belonging."
4Throughout the history of Western philosophy, ontology and metaphysics have
been used interchangeably.I am using the word "metaphysics" here only to refer to the
articulation or understanding of reality as a whole, that is to say, to the relationship
between the parts and the whole. On this issue, see, e.g., Wolfhart Pannenberg,
MetapLysics and the Idea of God, trans. Philip Clayton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998),
130-152; and Martin Heidegger, A n Intmducfion to MetapAsic~,trans. Ralph Manheim
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).
46MillardErickson, Evange/ical Itztepntation (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993),99-103;
and D. R. Griffin, W. Beardslee, and J. Holland, Vmeties ofPostmodern Theology (Albany:
State University of New York, l989), 1-7.
47MarkC. Taylor, Deconstmcting Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1982);and idem,

attempt to talk about God from within the context of our secular relativistic
postmodern culture and in a nontheological
Deconstruction is a critical
readtng of interpretive and systematic traditions.
Deconstruction is not a new phenomenon. Jesus (Matt 15:2-6; Mark 7:l13)and Luther49used deconstruction effectively and properly. Deconstruction,
however, has not been a prominent feature in the practice of theological
method because of the importance of theological tradition^.^' This situation
may be explained, in some degree, by the fact that it is difficult to criticize the
ground on which one stands. At the begrnning of the twenty-first century,
deconstruction has become prominent as a methodological feature of
postmodern philosophy. Before we can think of applying deconstruction to
evangelical theology we need to become aware of the way in which
deconstruction is understood in the postmodern context.
By the end of the sixties, French philosopher Jacques Derrida employed
the term "deconstruction" to describe his method of literary and philosophical
critici~m.~'
We do not need to deal with Derrida's deconstruction in d e t d here.
Only a brief reference to his understanding of deconstruction will help us to
understand the sense in which I use the term "deconstruction" in this article.
John Caputo, who has done a remarkable job introducing Derrida's
thought to American readers, tells us that Derrida's deconstruction is textual,
"transgressive," and messianic. It is textual because it concentrates on classical
texts and uses linguistic p r o c e d ~ r e s It
. ~is
~ "transgressive" because it reads
classical texts in dissonance with or transgressing favorite interpretive
tradition^.^^ Finally, Derrida's deconstruction is messianic-it has a positive
side-because opening itself to an absolute future allows for a reinvention of

Erring: A Postmodern Theoh0 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
T a y l o r , Deconstfucting Theology, xi.
49Smith,109-110.
T h i s may be explained in part by the fact that, explicitly or implicitly, tradition
plays an authoritative role very close to the role of biblical revelation. See, e.g., Dulles,
103-104.
"John D. Caputo, ed., Deconstmction zn a Nut.shel.A Conversation withJacques Demida
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 77.
52Thisbecomes apparent when we consider Caputo's example of deconstruction.
The text is a passage of Plato's Timeaus, where Derrida focuses on the spatial receptacle
(Khha), in which the Demiurge generates the sensory copies of the intelligible ideas.
This allows Derrida to distinguish between the Platonic text and Platonic philosophy
and to use the former to criticize the latter (ibid., 82-92). Thus Derrida's analysis of
Mato's text becomes "transgressive" of Platonism as philosophical tradition.
'?acques Derrida's "transgression" corresponds to Thomas S. Kuhn's "anomalies"
in normal science. It magnifies that which does not fit the interpretative criteria of
"normal science" or accepted para*
(The Stmcture of Scient$ic Revo/utions, 2d ed.
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970],52).

relig~on.~~
Of course, Derrida has in mind a secular kind of religion based on
human faith (experience),not on divine revelation in history (Scripture).
Derrida's deconstruction, however, is less revolutionary than Martin
Heidegger's. Hans-Georg Gadarner underlined the revolutionary nature of
Heidegger's approach by saying that he "changed the philosophical consciousness
of time with one stroke. Heidegger unleashed a critique of cultural idealism that
reached a wide public-a
destruction of the dominant phdosophical
tradition-and a swirl of radical questions."55Moreover, "the brilliant scheme of
Being and Time meant a total transformation of the intellectual climate, a
transformation that had lasting effects on almost all the s~iences."'~
Why was
Heidegger7sthought so revolutionary? One reason might be that he not only
criticized the hermeneutical foundations on which classical and modem
phdosophy were built, but also replaced them with somethingvery different.
The deconstructionI am proposing, then, is not negative deconstructionism,
but a critical instrument to open the way for new theological constructions. The
question is whether evangelical theology needs a new theological formulation.
After all, doesn't evangelical theology contain the gospel? That may very well be
so; yet, in the midst of evangelicalism we find theological fragmentation and
conflictingpositions.57Moreover, as we have seen above, evangelicaltheologians
are presently involved in rethinking evangelical theology in dialogue with the
postmodem context.58Yet, they continue the old practice of remodeling old
houses without considering buildmg new ones. As methodological-theological
procedure, deconstruction is necessary to open a way through the maze of
philosophical and theological interpretations facing theologians at the beginning
of the twenty-first century. The hope is that its application is pursued as a critical
instrument necessary to open the intellectualspace where theologians could build
their theologies from Scripture.
Protestant theology came into existence because the great Reformers
Luther and Calvin relentlessly deconstructed the salvation-by-works system
favored by Catholic theology. They deconstructed it from what Scripture says,
just as Derrida deconstructs Platonism from what Plato's classical texts say.
However, the Reformers did not deconstruct the hermeneutical foundation of
classical theology. They constructed their theological understanding of the
biblical truth about justification by faith from the classical system of macrohermeneutics operative in Roman Catholic theology. In this way, the positive
religious change obtained by their labors was clouded by a macro hermeneutics

55~ans-Georg
Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement," in Pbihsophicd
Henncneufics, ed. David E. Linge &os Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1976),138.
"Ibid., 138-139.
57StanleyGrenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Fonnahfionabm: Sbqbing Theohgy in a
Postmodm Context (Louisville:WestminsterJohn Knox, 2001),4-11;see also Vanhoozer,xv.
"For an introduction to ongoing theological constructions in evangelicalism,see,
e.g., Dorrien, 185-209.

that distorted the content of biblical revelation. In time, these principles
precipitated the modernist approach to theology and, in our days, the need to
adjust the gospel to postmodern culture.
Deconstruction is also necessary to dispel the illusion that evangelical
theology is biblical in a different, more foundational sense than Roman Catholic
or Modem theologes. Regular members of the church are under this illusion.
Theologians know better. They know that evangelical theology cannot stand on
Scripture alone, but also requires the macro-hermeneutical help of classical
philosophy.59To properly understand the task of deconstruction, then, we need
to become aware of both the pldosophical origin of Christian hermeneutics and
the philosophical deconstruction of the philosophy used in its construction.

As we saw in the section "Hermeneutical Principles," the macro-hermeneutical
principles operative in Christian theology include the interpretation of the
following key issues or realities: Being, God, human nature, world, totality as
a whole, human knowledge, hermeneutics, methodology, and revelationinspiration. All of these, except for revelation-inspiration, have been studied
traditionally by philosophical disciplines, such as general and regonal
ontologies, philosophical theology, anthropology, cosmology, metaphysics,
epistemology, and hermeneutics.
Most evangelical theologans use philosophy in an intuitive rather than
intentional fashion. In general, they minimize the role of philosophy in their
theologies as playing only a subordinated instrumental role necessary to
"facktate" the proclamation of the gospel.60To avoid the ever-present danger
that philosophy may rule over theology, some theologans advise using
phdosophy occasionally, while avoidrng adherence to a single philosophcal
system.61In spite of thts advice, the hermeneutical influence of philosophical,
ontologxal, and epistemological theories has played a leading role in the
construction of Christian theology, including the understanding of the gospel.
Thomas Aquinas developed the macro-hermeneutical principles from
which he wrote his massive and influential Summa Tbeobgicd2 in a small booklet
entitled On Being and Essence.63There, he adapted Aristotle's ontological and
'Vhis dependence becomes apparent when theologians refuse to let go of the
multiplex of theological sources gathered under the umbrella of the Wesleyan
Quadrilateral.
e.g., Pinnock, 22-23.
6'RichardRice, Reason and the Contoun ofFaith (Riverside, CA: La Sierra University
Press, 1991), 201.
62ThomasAquinas, Summa Theobgica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province, 3 vols. (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947).
63ThomasAquinas, On Being andEs.rence,trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Garden
City Press, 1949).

epistemological insights into a macro-hermeneutical grid from which to do
Christian theology. Unfortunately, most theologians are not so explicit in
uncovering their macro-hermeneutical presuppositions or the way in which
they use philosophical insights in theology. For instance, Calvin did not explain
in detail the way in which his theological construction consciously or
unconsciously depended on herrneneutical principles derived from
philosophical teachings. An analysis of his writings, however, uncovers his
dependence on Augustine for theological guidance, especially in the doctrine
of predestination." And we know that Augustine's doctrine of predestination
flows from his neo-Platonic macro hermeneutics, in particular his timeless
understanding of God's being and the human
Thus many doctrines that
appear to be "biblical" are interpretations or constructions made with biblical
materials from a philosophical, nonbiblical base.
Classical Tbeologca/Hermeneutics
Christian theology needs deconstruction because it was constructed under the
guidance of philosophical ideas that took over the hermeneutical role that
properly belongs to divine revelation. Anticipating this danger, Paul warned
Christ's followers to be on guard so "that no one makes a prey of you by
philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradttion, according to the
elemental spirits of the universe, and not accordmg to Christ" (Col 2:8, RSV).
Christ &self rebuked church leaders because they made void the word of God
through their tradition (Mark 7:13; Matt 15:l-3). In spite of these clear warnings,
early Christian theologians began to use Greek ontological insights as macrohermeneutical presuppositions from which to build their theologies.
Unfortunately,what Paul was afraid of and Christ condemnedwas the source that
shaped the hermeneutical principles used in the constructions of classical
Christian theology. Thus what Heidegger characterized as the onto-theo-logical
constitution of metaphysics was replicated in the onto-theo-logical construction
of theology.66This means that theology was constructed from the hermeneutical
basis of Greek ontology (onto) that defined the meaning of God's being (tbeo), and
from it the interpretation of Christian doctrines as hgia.This structure defines the
hermeneutical structure of Christian and evangelical theologies.
Very early in church history, theologians began to draw their hermeneutical
64FranqoisWendel, Calvin: Ongins and Deuehpment of His Rehgious Thought, trans.
Philip Mairet (Grand Rapids: Baker, l963), 124-125.
65Augustinederived his timeless understanding of God not from Scripture, but
from Parmenides's interpretation of Being. Since the timelessness of God's being
determines the way in which his will acts, it also determines the understanding of divine
predestination and, through it, the gospel. On the timelessness of God in Augustine,
see, e.g., Confessions, trans. John K. Ryan (Garden City: Image, 1960), chap. 11; on the
timelessness of God's will, see chaps. 12,15,18.
66Martin Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphyics," in
Irientip and DzJennce, ed. John Sambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 54,60.

perspectives not from Scripture, but from Greek phdosophy: "In the
conversation between the initial (Palestinian-Jewish) Christian formulation and
its new Hellenistic environment, both partners changed. Neither lost its soul.
S o m e b g new emerged."67What emerged was classical Christian theology.
The intermingling between philosophy and theology took place at a level so
deep that most of what we today know as Christianity does not correspond to
biblical thinking.This fateful alliance brought theologians to the conviction that
theology has a diversity of sources, notably, Scripture, tradtion, reason
(philosophy, science, culture), and experience. Even today we can trace the
reasons for the differences between theological projects of various
denominations back to the hermeneutical principles they work from and the
source from which these principles have been derived.
Dependence on Greek ontology brought about two paradigmatic changes
at the macro-hermeneutical level. The conviction that neo-Platonism properly
described the nature of reality led Christian theologans to adopt its views on
God's being and human nature for theological use. Thus the "onto-theological" movement as the basis of the constitution of Christian tradition began.
The notions that God's being and the human soul are not temporal but
timeless realities became hermeneutical guides in the construction of Christian
theology.They played a decisive macro-hermeneutical role in the interpretation
of Scripture (micro hermeneutics) and the construction of Christian doctrines
(meso hermeneutics). They also led in the interpretation, formulation, and
application of the theological m e t h ~ d . ~ '
The philosophical and scientific base from which Christian theology has
been defrned in hermeneutical approaches largely accounts for modern and
postmodem theological fragmentation. Since consciously or unconsciously
Christian theologians derive their hermeneutical approaches from philosophy
and science, changes in philosophy and/or science unavoidably call for change
in the hermeneutical approach and in the formulation of doctrines.
Modem theologians openly derive their macro-hermeneuticalviews from
modem and postmodem science and philosophy. They cannot accept biblical
views that do not fit their intellectual and moral preference^.^^ Though in
theory, classical, modem, and postmodern theologies could deconstruct their
67Ja~k
A. Bonsor, Athens andJemsahm: The Roh OfPhilossophJyin Theobgy (New York:
Paulist, 1993), 26. Defining theological hermeneutics from philosophy was not an
unknown procedure. Philo had already used it in his construction of Jewish theology.
That philosophy and science determine the hermeneutical perspective from which
Chtistian theology was constructed is a fact broadly accepted and methodologically
defended by most theological traditions. For a technical introduction to the
hermeneutical role that philosophy has played and continues to play in Christian
theology, see Bonsor.
68FemandoCanale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology? In Search
of a Working Proposal," Neue ZeitJchriftfir Systematische Theologie und Reh$on~hilosophie
43/3 (2001):366-389.
69Dorrien,187.

views, they will not apply it to the macro-herrneneutical level on which their
views stand. After all, they cannot reject the ground that allows them freedom
to reconstruct theology every few years. Those who work along these lines
seem to have forgotten Christ's closing remarks in his Sermon on the Mount
when he clearly warned that "Every one who hears these words of mine and
does not do them wlll be like a foolish man who built his house upon the sand;
and the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against that
house, and it fell; and great was the fall of it" (Matt 7:26-27, RSV).
Most conservative Protestant and evangelical theologians honestly believe
their theologies flow from biblical macro-henneneuticalprinciples. They affirm
the primacy of Scripture in its hermeneutic, doctrinal, and critical functions. A
critical analysis of their teachings, however, reveals that even conservative
evangelical theologians buld their doctrines on classical macro- and mesohermeneutical principle^.'^ Perhaps evangelical theologans who take Scripture
seriously might be willing to deconstruct their own traditions to free Christian
theology from the long centuries of hermeneuticalbondage under science and
philosophy. Perhaps they could understand that the painful deconstruction of
cherished ideas is the condition necessary for letting God's word be heard anew
in our postrnodern context.
In short, that Christian thinkers constructed (interpreted, formulated)
''A recent example of this situation can be found in Wayne Grudem, Jyztematic
Theology: An Introduction to Bibbcal Docirine (Leicester: InterVarsity, 1994). Although
Grudem, 21, defines the task of systematic theology as the investigation about what the
whole Bible teaches us today on any given topic, he, 168-171, assumes the
interpretation of God's Being according to classical timeless ontology. Interestingly,all
the biblical evidence he gives actually teaches the temporality of God. Yet, as is
customary, he uses texts that show God's temporality to affirm his timelessness. This
reveals he unconsciously works from dassical macro-hermeneutical presuppositions.
Surprisingly, he, 169, grounds divine timelessness, not from tradition or Greek
philosophy, but by inferring it from scientific knowledge: "The study of physics tells us
that matter and time and space must all occur together: if there is no matter, there can
be no space or time either. Thus, before God created the universe, there was not 'time,'
at least not in the sense of a succession of moments one after another." Though
Gmdern's reasoning is correct, the truth he is affirmingis taught in Scripture (1 Cor 27)
and does not imply the timelessness of God's being. That he brings timelessness from
outside Scripture becomes clear from his analysis of 2 Pet 3:8. Grudem, 170, correctly
sees the text as revealing God's experience of time. Yet he hastens to qualify his biblical
analysis by saying that "God's experience of time is not just a patient endurance
dflerent experience of time
through eons of endless duration, but he has a q~abtative~
than we do. This is consistent with the idea that in his own being, God is timeless; he
does not experience a succession of moments. This has been the dominant view of
Christian orthodoxy through the history of the church, though it has been frequently
challenged, and even today many theologians deny it." Thus timelessness enters
through the back door of tradition. Because Grudem works from classical, nonbiblical,
macro-hermeneutical presuppositions, he cannot perceive the contradiction between
the biblical understanding of God's relation to created time and classical Greek
ontological timelessness.

classical theology under the hermeneutical kection of Greek ontology is an
undisputed historical fact. Without changing the hermeneutical perspective
adopted from Greek ontology, modem theologians constructed the modem
project of theology on the hermeneutical roots of modem epistemology.At the
beginning of the twentieth-first century,philosophers have replaced epistemology
with hermene~tics.~'Not surprisingly, we find evangelical theologians
"reconstrucang" evangelical theology from a macro-hermeneutical perspective
that includes the ontologicalguidance of classical philosophy, the epistemological
insights of modernity, and the hermeneutical criticism of p~stmodernity.~~

The Phibsophical Deconstruction of
Ckusical Ontohg
We have arrived at a pivotal point in our presentation. Unfortunately, next to
the grounding macro-hermeneutical role that ontology has in evangelical
theology we find evangelical forgetfulness about it. There are some reasons
that may shed light on this fateful forgetfdness. First, the constructors of
evangelical theology did not speak about "ontology" or "ontological" issues.
The operative notion is that if Luther and Calvin were able to do theology by
going directly to Scripture and tradition witho~tdepending on ontological
insights, contemporary evangelical theologians should be able to do the same.
Second, as a movement American evangelicalism came into existence in
modern times when a new emphasis on epistemology pushed ontology aside.
Since Reni Descartes, philosophers endeavored to ground philosophy on
epistemological terrain. Philosophical emphasis turned away from the study
of reality (ontology) to the study of the cognitive foundations on which
philosophy and science budd their teachings (epistemology). Thus ontology
receded from the limelight and theologians became more conversant with
epistemological issues and the demands of modern scientific reason. This
modern "turn to the subject" still hovers large over postmodernity. A third
reason may be that Lyotard's and Rorty's influential accounts of
postmodernity work within the epistemological-hermeneutical&vide oblivious
of ontological issues.73
However, while this debate was taking place on the English-speakingside
of the philosophical world, continental philosophy approached the same
epistemological-hermeneuticaldivide in close associationwith groundbreaking
71RichardRorty's characterization of postmodernity as the movement from
epistemology to hermeneutics may seem forced, yet it communicates with clarity the
radical change postmodem philosophers have introduced in their interpretation of
human knowledge (Philosophy and the Minor of Nature, 2d ed. [Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 19791,315-356).
72Thistakes place notably in the theological projects of Oden and Grenz.
Searchingforthe CognitiveFounhtions
73FernandoCanale, Back to Rcvebtion-In~piration:
of Chn'stian Theohgy in a Postmodenr Worki (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
2001), 17-19.

progress in ontological reflection. After all, reason's structure is unavoidably
linked to our understanding of reality." American philosophers' primary
concentration on epistemological issues has almost concealed from evangelical
theologians the paradigmatic ontological change that accompanies the
postmodem turn to hermeneutical reason."
Heidegger set the ontological interpretation on which postmodem
hermeneutical reason stands. In so doing, he has implicitly shown that
postmodernity is not a partial departure from some features of modem
thinking, but a radical departure from the intellectualparadgm that has defined
Western philosophy and culture since Parrnenides's times. Here I will point to
the change in a simple and concise manner. In so doing, my purpose is to show
that Christian theology cannot keep building on tradition without first
deconstructingits herrneneutical foundations.
Heidegger deconstructed not only modem but also classical philosophical
traditions. He accomplished that by purposely focusing on the notion of
Being, the most general of all human concepts. His epoch-making Being and
Time begins by doubting that philosophy had properly understood the notion
of Being and suggesting that we should attempt to understand it from a
temporal per~pective.~~
As far as I know, Heidegger never claimed he was
turning more than two millennia of philosophical traltion upside down.
However, this is, in fact,what his thought ac~omplished.~~
Yet it seems he was
not totally aware of the radical nature of his ontological proposal.
In what did Heidegger's paradgmatic shift in ontological interpretation
reside? First, he dealt with Being, not with beings. That is, he worked in the
field of general rather than regional ontology.Thus he did not try to understand
74Parmenidesseems to have been the first to recognize this linkage when he
affirmed, "it is the same thing to think and to be" ("The Way to Truth," in A n d . to the
pre-Sooatic Phihophers: A Complete Transkation of the Fragments in DieLr, Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker, ed. Kathleen Freeman [Oxford: Blackwell, 1948],42).
751say "almost" because ontological studies are present in the work of American
philosophers Alfred North Whitehead, Pmms andRea@:An Essg in Comohy (New York:
Macmillan, 1929); and Charles Hartshome, The Divine Rclbth@ A Aouaf Conepion ofGod
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948).Though some could argue that Whitehead's and
Hartshome's neoclassicalphilosophical constructions are "postmodem," others could find
reasons to see them as modem philosophers. The less critical and more constructive work
does not advance along the lines of Rorty's replacement of epistemology by hermeneutics.
76MartinHeidegger, Being and T i m trans.John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(New York: Harper and Collins, 1962), 1.
77Heidegger characterized traditional ontology not as being wrong, but
euphemistically as being "forgetful." As with all philosophers, he felt his work was
completing philosophy by working in what tradition had forgotten. Because of this
forgetfulness, the traditional understanding of Being stands in need of radical
correction. In this way, Heidegger seems to suggest that his interpretation of Being
stands beyond the relativism that its hermeneutical adoption has triggered in the
postmodern sciences.

only concrete entities (such as God, man, cosmos, substance), but also Being.
At least in Being and Time, he explicitly set up the understanding of Being as his
ultimate goal.78Since Aristotle, Being has been recognized to be the most
general notion the human mind is capable of conceiving. This means that
"Being cannot indeed be conceived as an entity," nor can it "be derived from
By selecting Being as his object of study,
higher concepts by definiti~n."~~
Heidegger placed his quest at the spring from which everything else flows in
phdosophical thinlung. Tlvs is because, in its all-inclusive generality, "an
understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anythlng which one
apprehends in en ti tie^."^ We can better appreciate the far-reaching
consequences that the interpretation of Being has for the human sciences when
Heidegger unpacks its macro-herrneneutical role:
The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the aption'
conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which
examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so
doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also
for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior
to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundati~ns.~~

The interpretation of Being, then, influences the interpretation of the
entire span of human knowledge and, of course, the interpretation of Scripture.
Aquinas helps us to appreciate the overarclungimplications that any change in
the interpretation of Being unleashes in any construction of theology by saying
that "a small error at the outset can lead to great errors in the final
con~lusions."~~
Hermeneutically speaking, at the "beginning" we find the
concept of Being, which as all-inclusive macro-hermeneutical principle,
conditions the understandingof all other macro-hermeneuticalpresuppositions.
In other words, our consciously or unconsciously assumed understanding of
Being shapes our interpretation of the other macro-hermeneutical principles,
whlch include God, human nature, the whole-part totality, cosmology, reason,
interpretation,methodology,and revelation-inspiration. Even when theologians
may not be aware of the question of Being or its interpretation, their
understandingof the other macro-hermeneutical presuppositions guiding their
theologies necessarily assumes an understanding of Being.
However, the study of being is only the phce where Heidegger's
philosophical revolution took place. The revolution consists in his decision to
understand Being from the horizon of time.83In Being and Time, his aim was to
78Heidegger,Being and Tim, Intro. 1.1.
791bid.,Intro. 1.1.l-2.
Tbid., Intro. 1.1.1.
allbid.,Intro. 1.3.
82Aquinas,On Being and Essence, 1; Aristotle, On the Heavens, 1, 5; 27lb, 8.
83Heideggerannounces in his preface to Being and Tim "Our aim in the following
treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our

interpret the meaning of time and to use it as horizon for understanding
Being.84In so doing, Heidegger found himself at the climax of the long process
through which the classical ontological-epistemological system was being
deconstructed. The starting point of this process may be traced back to the
English Empiricists. The outcome of this movement is postmodernity.
Heidegger's contribution was to perceive the epochal change in philosophical
perspective that resulted from centuries of dissatisfaction with the classical
philosophcal paradgm and to adopt a new interpretation of Being as the
ground from which all philosophical, scientific, and theological discourse is
conceived and formulated.In sum, he dared to change the understanding of the
broadest, most inclusive macro-hermeneuticalprinciple.
Thomas Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions may help us understand
Heidegger's philosophical rev~lution.~~
What we witness in and around
Heidegger's thought is a paradigm shift of gigantic proportions. In a process
that took many centuries, philosophers became increasingly aware that the
classical Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelic paradigm (normal science) was not
able to explain satisfactorily all the data they were supposed to explain. Little
by little, time was introduced as the perspective from which to interpret
traditional philosophical issues. Heidegger installed that perspective in the
philosophical "most holy place," namely, in the understanding of Being. In so
doing, he was, in fact, formulating with technical precision the basis for a new
philosophical understanding of ontology. Based on previous deconstructiveconstructive attempts made, notably, by Locke, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche,
Dilthey, and Husserl, Heidegger had enough background to formulate the shift
from the classical paradigm to the postmodern one at the ontological level.
Concretely, when Heidegger dogmatically decided to understand Being from
the horizon of time, he was, in fact, replacing the classical paradigm that had,
since Parrnenides, approached the understanding of Being and beings from the
horizon of timeles~ness.~~
provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any
understandmg whatsoever of Being." In n. 4 of the preface, the translators explain the
meaning of the word "horizon": "We tend to think of a horizon as something which
we may widen or extend or go beyond; Heidegger, however, seems to think of it rather
as something which we can neither widen nor go beyond, but which provides the limits
for certain intellectual activities performed 'within' it."
84Asit happened, Heidegger never dealt with the question of Being in Being and

Time.Rather, he addressed it in A n Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
85SeeKuhn.
"jWhen seen from this perspective, modernity appears to be a transitional stage.
The state of uncertainty at the beginning of the twenty-f~stcentury that we have
labeled "postmodernity" appears to be the result of a lack of working consensus in
"normal science." Yet the temporal-historical, macro-ontological-herrneneutical
perspective from which to work out a new "normal science" consensus paradlgm is

The HemteneuticalAItemative
Since Christian theologcal traditions were built under the macro-hermeneutical
guidance of classical ontology, we should consider the consequences that the
paradigmatic shift in ontological perspective formulated by Heidegger has for
the task of doing evangelical theology in the twenty-first century.
For a number of reasons that we cannot enumerate in this article,
evangelical theologians have not followed the postrnodern shift at the
ontologicallevel as closely as they have followed its epistemologicaland cultural
consequences. As it is currently perceived, the postmodern shift from
epistemological to hermeneutical reason only prevents evangelical theologians
from making absolute and universal rational statements. The postmodern shift
from a timeless to a temporal approach to ontology, however, has deeper
repercussions. One of them is that in the timeless approach, theological
deconstruction is not necessary, while in the temporal approach it becomes
unavoidable.
Let us review some facts that lead to the need to deconstruct evangelical
theology. First, the most universal and all-inclusive of all hermeneutical
principles is the concept of Being." Second, Parrnenides origjnated the classical
tradition that interprets Being from a timeless horizon.'' Third, when Plato and
Aristotle decided to build their ontologies from the timeless horizon suggested
by Parmenides, Western philosophy fured the macro-hermeneutical direction
from which classical and modern philosophies and theologies would be
constr~cted.~~
Fourth, classical Chnstian theology sealed its intellectual destiny
when Justin Martyr (implicitly) and Origen and Augustine (explicitly)
interpreted God and human nature as nontemporal and nonhistorical from
within the Platonic ontological tradtion. This decision defined the macrohermeneutical principles for classical, modern, and evangelical theologie~.~~
Fifth, as a culmination of a long process of deconstruction, the undisputed
reign of the classical philosopkcal synthesis came to an end when Heidegger
convincingly argued that Being can also be interpreted from a temporal

already beginning to sit deep in the consciousness of Western philosophy and
scholarship. Achieving this might take several generations, even centuries.
87Aristotle,Metaphysics, XI, 3.
9'armenides, 7-8; Fernando Luis Canale,A Criticism ofTheo/ogicaIRearon: The and
Time/eszneess a~ Primordiai Pre~@osiriom, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral
Dissertation Series (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1983), 76-1 14.
89Plato,Timaear, 37.d-38.c. Heidegger recognized their parad.tgmatic influence by
saying that "what these two men [Plato and Aristotle] achieved was to persist through
many alterations and 'retouchings' down to the logic' of Hegel" (Beingand Time, Intro. 1.1).
W o d e r n macro hermeneutics modifies classical macro hermeneutics only in its
epistemologicalcomponent; it is a modification associated with the temporal-spatial limits
Kant set on pure (classical) reason (Immaneul Kant, Critz$ue4 P m Rearon, trans. J. M. D.
Meiklejohn puffalo: Prometheus, 19901, intro. to "Transcendental Aesthetics").

horizon. Apparently, Heidegger's approach stands at the antipode of
Parmenides's. Sixth, therefore philosophy and theology face a primordial
alternative at the most inclusive or deepest macro-hermeneutical level. The
unavoidable question arises: Should philosophers and theologians approach the
understandng of Being and beings from a timeless or a temporal horizon?
Unfortunately, the movement from classical to hermeneutical reason has
shown convincingly that reason cannot decide among commensurable
conflicting interpretive options with absolute certainty. At the primordial
macro-hermeneutical level-where the horizon for understanding Being, and
through it everything else within the reach of human knowledge, is
located-philosophical reason cannot ground an absolutely certain decision.
Nevertheless, choose we must, even if only by default, otherwise our reason
would not be able to function properly. Since reason cannot help us to decide,
we must seek gwdance from the sources of theology.
If modem and postmodern deconstruction-constructiondisqualifiedreason
to help us make h s grounding macro-hermeneutical decision, the next obvious
choice is to decide from the perspective of tradition. It is through tradition that
Oden's postmodern orthodoxy and Grenz's "theology from the community of
attempt to overcome the demise of classical and modem understanding
of absolute reason and the rise of hermeneutical reason. In so doing, they are
following the Catholicway in order to surmount the challenge of p~stmodernity?~
This route has the double advantage of being endorsed, albeit for different
reasons, by both the postmodern "academic guild" and the "church board."
Besides, since this course of action does not involve the deconstruction of
tradition but its affirmation, theologians can, with little effort, use the guidance of
classical macro-hermeneutical principles to produce complete "postmodem"
systematic theologies. A disadvantage of this path is that it draws its rnacrohermeneutical principles from neo-Platonic and Aristotelian ontologies that have
been deconstructed by postmodern philosophy?3Moreover, by neglectmg the
temporal approach to ontology assumed by postmodern reason, this approach
incurs a methodolo~calcontradction. Besides, it substantiallyreduces to a bare
minimum the contribution and role that Scripture plays in the construction of
Christian theology. In sum, it dimmishes the role of &vine revelation in Scripture
and does not account for the paradlgrn shift in ontological understandmgimplicit
in postmodern thmkmg.
When conceiving and formulating the contents of the macro-hermeneutical
principles of biblical interpretation and doctrinal construction, evangelical thinking
'lGrenz, Renewing the Center, 208-209.
"John Paul I1 states: "It is to be hoped that now and in the future there will be those
who continue to cultivate this great philosophical and theological tradition for the good
of both the Church and humanity7'(Fib et Ratio: EngckdLd#er to the Bishops @the C&c
Church on the Rekafionshfp between Fairh and Reason (Vatican: Holy See Web Site, 1998).
93Notsurprisingly, both Oden (The Living God, 61-54) and Grenz (Theofogyfor the
Commum'fy ofGod, 91-92) understand God as a timeless being.

should decide between Parrnenides's timelessnessand Heidegger's temporality not
from human tradition or philosophies, but, following Erickson's suggestion, from
the unchanging ground of biblical re~elation.~~
God, Time, and Deconstn/ction
Yet, how do we answer from Scripture the question of Being that Parmenides,
Aristotle, and Heidegger addressed? Scripture does not give thought to this
question as these philosophers did. Besides, we do not find in Scripture a
technically developed ontology, such as we find in their works. Yet, even
though biblical writers did not formulate an ontology following the same
procedures and thought patterns we find in Greek philosophy, that does not
mean they did not think about these entities. It only means that they reflected
about these questions in a different way.
As a matter of fact, Scripture includes specific and detailed interpretations
about the beings of God, humans, the world, and the whole. So far, however,
most theologians have not appreciated the ontological import of biblical
teachings on these issues because they have always interpreted biblical teachings
from macro-hermeneutical presuppositions drawn from Greek philosophy.
When consciously or unconsciously believers interpret biblical texts from
classical macro-hermeneutical principles, the meaning of Scripture becomes
adjusted to the timeless horizon of Greek ontology.
:The only way to grasp the ontological weight of Scripture consists in
canceling out the traditional readmgs of Scripture (contra Oden, Grenz, and
Catholic theology). Technically, this step is analogous to Husserl's
methodological inoxrj (epoch+ Methodological hox4 is the bracketing out of
something." When we place an idea or theory under suspension (knoxil), two
main consequences follow. First, we suspend judgment on that whlch we place
within brackets. Second, we cannot use the bracketed-out idea or theory in our
thmking. Thus we are ready to understand, appreciate, and use biblical
teachmgs to define our macro-hermeneutical presuppositions.Oscar Cullmann
says the same thing in simpler terms by advising us to avoid philosophical
categories when interpreting NT
94Eri~kson,
Truth or Conquences, 327.
95EdmundHusserl defined and used a methodological procedure he called i m o ~ f i
to gain a perspective that would be "free from all theory" (I&a.r: Generallntroduction to
Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, 4th ed. [London:George Allen Unwin,

19311, 111).
"Oscar Cullmann states:'The frame within which the writers of the New Testament
worked ought to be the same limits which New Testament scholars accept for theit work
This means that we must at least attempt to avoid philosophical categories" (Christ and
Time: The Pn'mtive Chn'stian Conqbtion $Time and Hislop, trans. Floyd V. Filson, 3d ed.
Philadelphia: Westminster, 19641, 11). Cullmann's advice to not use philosophical
categories when reading the NT is not a denial of the philosophical import of the biblical
texts, but an affirmation that the NT writers did not think from the philosophically

My proposal goes a step further. Whereas Cullrnann claims NT scholars
should avoid using philosophical categories, I argue that systematic theologians
should do the same. It is difficult to see how changing the macro-hermeneutical
horizon from which NT writers thought, would help systematicians to
understand and construct Christian theology in faithfulness to divine revelation.
Changmg the biblical macro-hermeneutical horizon in systematic theology from
biblical times to phtlosophical timelessness required a deconstruction of biblical
thinking and a new constructionguided by philosophcal categories harmonious
with the timeless horizon. Classical, modern, and evangelical theologies have
been constructed on this hermeneutical tradition that I propose to deconstruct.
Some theologians who deconstruct traditionally accepted views claim to do it
by readmg Scripture from "suppressed and marginalized" theological
tradition^.^' In evangelical theology, however, we should deconstruct from
Scripture and not by pitting one tradition against the other. Scripture must be
the ground and instnunent to deconstruct all traditions.
When we read Scripture by purposely canceling the hermeneutical function
of the classical interpretation of God as timeless being, we discover what was
obvious but dismissed because it did not fit the macro-hermeneutical
presuppositionsbrought by the exegete and theologian to the text. In Scripture,
biblical writers understand God and his actions not from the horizon of
timelessness, but from the horizon of time. We should realize that when we
read Scripture from a temporal rather than a timeless macro-hermeneutical
horizon (general and regional ontologies) we are de facto deconstructing
Christian and evangelical traditions. Since, in so doing, we are also building our
ontological, epistemological, and hermeneutical macro-hermeneutical
preunderstandings not from reason but from Scripture, we are overcoming
postmodernity postmodernly. In other words, the postmodem understanding
of reason has no place for the claim that reason can reach absolute truth
beyond interpretation or legitimize one interpretation over all others with
absolute certainty. It is also true that the reception of biblical revelation takes
place through interpretation. Yet the horizon and the principles of
interpretation are not forced on us by the tradtions to which we belong. On
the contrary, we can deconstruct our traditions and define our hermeneutical
perspective in continuity or opposition to them.
Contrary to general opinion, the interpretive nature of reason does not
imply subjectivity or relativism. Postmodernity has not let go of objectivity; it
has only deconstructed the classical-modeminterpretation of it generated from
the horizon of timelessness. It is also constructing a new understanding of
objectivity from the horizon of time. Thus those who interpret reason from the
horizon of timelessness incorrectly adjudicate relativism to postrnodemity.
Moreover, we should recognize that theological fragmentationresults from the
generated macro hermeneutics assumed by both Roman Catholic and Protestant
dogrnaticians.
97Smith,1 12.

hermeneutical nature of human reason as created by God9' and not from sin,
intellectual defect, or the advent of relativistic postmodern thinking.Realizing
that to know is to interpret may help us to understand why there are, and
always will be, many ways to understand Chri~tianity.~~
Thus the classical and modem ways of thinking, which I suggest evangelical
theology should deconstruct, will continue to exist. Because all interpretations of
Christianityare cornmensurable,'00postmodernity sets the stage for the unfolding
of a conflict of interpretational dynamics. So, while it is true that in Christian
theology many interpretations are possible, it is also true that not every
interpretation is true to Scripture's way of thinking. In theology,we should decide
theologically, that is, from divine biblical revelation, not from reason.
In deciding the evangelical interpretive horizon, then, we should consider
first whether biblical authors assumed an all-inclusive temporal or timeless
hermeneutical horizon (the notion of Being). Exegetically and theologically, this
task involves many aspects that go far beyond the limits of this article. Here, I
only want to show that divine revelation in Scripture works within the horizon
of time. As few philosophers have dealt specifically with the issue of Being as
an all-inclusive horizon for understanding, few theologians have dealt explicitly
with the question of time or timelessness as horizons for understanding.
Working from an exegetical modernist perspective, Cullrnann has
specificallyquestionedScripture regardmgits own hermeneuticalhorizon.lO'He
981nhis deconstructingof Augustinian tradition, Smith, 146-148, convincinglymakes
this point.
9?3yapplying Kuhn's notion of paradlgm shift, Hans Kung has shown the reason for
the existence of many schools of Christian theology (TheobgvjrtheTfirdMi~nnim);idem,
ChristMnig: Essence, HHistory, andFutm, trans. John Bowden (New York: Continuum, 1995);
and Hans Kung and David Tracy, eds. P m i g m Change in Theob~:A S m s i u m j r t h eFutun
(New York: Crossroad, 1991).
''"Here I use the term "commensurable" in a different sense than Rorty, 316, who
sees that discourses are commensurable only when they work under the same set of
rational rules. However, discourses can be commensurablein relation to acornmon subject
matter. Agreeingwith Rorty that reason can set for itself different rules to play the rational
game, I submit that discourses are commensurable when they share the same subject
matter. When we speak about the same thing from different rational perspectives (ie.,
macro-hermeneutical paradrgms) our discourses are commensurable. Only then can the
conflict of interpretations take place and one can ask the question about whether
conflicting discourses are mutually exclusive or complementary. If discourses are totally
incommensurable, they are by definition untelated and we cannot compare them either as
complementary or contradictory. So, I am not lapsing back to what Rorty calls
"epistemology," but rather arguing for the commensurability of hermeneutical discourse
where there are always several rationally valid ways to look at the same reality. The
question of truth has escaped the power of reason. In theology we do not despair,because
we decide the truth of theological assertions not from reason, but from biblical revelation.
'OICullmann, 9, specifically refers to the biblical notion of time as a "background"
notion, thus agreeing with the hermeneutical function of time I am underlining in this
article. I go beyond Cullrnann in broadening the hermeneutical role of time to the

has convincingly shown that biblical writers thought and wrote from within the
horizon of tirne.lo2 Recently, open-view theolog~ans'~~
working from a
systematic perspective have initiated a deconstruction of the AugustinianCalvinistic interpretation of divine providence. They found too many facts in
Scripture and experience refusing to fit w i b the normal AugustinianThornistic-Calvinstic science paradigm reigning in evangelical theology at the
turn of the millennium. Their own deconstructiveefforts led them to reject the
classical timeless understanding of God from which the classical Calvinistic
paradigm works and to replace it with a temporal understanding of God's being
grounded on Scripture and experience.lM
However, most open-view theologians are unaware of the larger macrohermeneutical consequences that their switch from a timeless to a temporal
understanding of God has beyond the doctrine of divine providen~e.'~~
They are
macro-hermeneutical level and applying it not only to exegesis, but also systematic
theology.
102Cullmann,
68, argues that biblical authors understood the death and resurrection
of Christ not from the horizon of timelessness, but from the horizon of time. If the
understanding of the central truth of Christianityrequires the horizon of time, it folows
that any construction that looks at the Christ of Christian theology from an implicit
timeless horizon must be deconstructed.
'O9ohn E. Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theolbgy ofProvidence (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity, 1998);Clark Pinnock, MostMovedMover, and idem, ed., The Openness of God
A Bibbcal Chalhnge to the Tradtional Unhstandng of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity,
1994).
'?See ~anders,24-25;Clark H. Pinnock, "Systematic Theology," in The Opnness
of God A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understandng of God, ed. Clark H . Pinnock
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), 119-121.
lo5Pinnockrecently recognized that he "did not for a moment imagine in 1994 that
our book on 'the openness of God' would create such interest and provoke such
controversy,particularly in the evangelical community" (MostMovedMover, ix). At the end
of Most MovedMover, Pinnock tells us that in advancing the open view of God he thought
he was "taking the Bible more seriously," encouraging us "to dunk more profoundly," and
addressing some questions surrounding our cherished relationship with God." Then he
asks, "Why the heated and often angry responses?" Only facing what he experienced as
disproportionatereactions from his own theologicalcommunity, Pinnock began to suspect
there could be more in what he was doing that he thought. "Obviously, I have touched a
raw nerve: the open view of God is different from the tradition of Augustine and Calvin
in many respects" (180). At the time, he did not yet seem to have a dear idea about the
macro-hermeneutical nature of the "raw nerve" he touched. The same can be said for his
critics, especially because they are reacting to what open theism actually says on divine
providence and not to the potential herrneneutical-horizon shift hidden behind the open
view of God as theological construction. Norman Geisler concludes that the open view
of God "leads to a denial of the infallibility of the Bible, the full omniscience of God, the
apologetic value of prophecy, and a biblical test for false prophets. It also undermines
confidence in the promises of God, his ability to answer prayer, and any ultimate victory
over sin. Indeed, it leads logically to universalism and/or annihilationism. And even an

still oblivious to having stumbled on and defacto switched the interpretation of the
ultimate, all-inclusive, macro-herrneneutical horizon of Christian theology. They
do not yet see all the implications of their paradigmatic switch.lo6However, other
evangelicaltheologians,workingwithin the normal scientific Calvinisticparadgrn,
have clearly perceived some of the hermeneutical consequences implicit in the
switch from a timeless to a temporal interpretationof God's being. Briefly put, on
the surface the controversy that the open view of God has generated revolves
around a small issue within the doctrine of divine providence. Yet, at the deeper
herrneneutical level, most open-view theologians have not yet perceived their
horizon shift from classicalphilosophical timelessness to biblical temporality. For
this reason, it is still too early to say if they would eventually embrace the new
horizon of biblical temporality or reject it.''
Ontologically speakmg, a phenomenological analysis of Exod 3, the
classical text referring to God's being, reveals that God's being is not timeless
but temporal.'08 Ths means that biblical authors assumed a temporal
interpretation of God's being compatible with the limited time and space of his
creation. Cullrnann and open-view theologans are correct-in Scripture, God
does not reveal himself from a timeless but from a temporal horizon.
Moreover, as Pinnock has correctly recognized, the timeless and temporal
horizons are mutually exclusive. We must choose one or the other.'@'
Since the timeless horizon has its origin in philosophical speculation and
the temporal-historical horizon has its origin in biblical revelation, it is not
cltfficult to ascertain which horizon evangelical theologians should adopt. Our
shift from a timeless to a temporal horizon, then, is not grounded on
reason-postmodem or otherwise-but on unchanging biblical revelation.
From this macro-hermeneuticalhorizon, we should attempt to understand not
alleged revelation of God, c o n h e d by an act of God, could be false. This undermines
any apologetic for Christianity and any credibility in prophetic daims on which the Bible
is based" (Creating God in the Image of Man? The New '0,ben" View of GocCNeofhGIjmS
Dangenw Drrft m e a p o l i s : Bethany, 19971,145).While correctly criticizing open theism,
Bruce A. Ware grasps its consequenceswithin the docuinal and ecclesiologicallevels (God's
Lesser Gbry: The Diminished God of Open Theism w e a t o n : Crossway, 20001, 16-19). I
personally do not agree with the open view of God because I see it as theological
construction frozen between two paradqps.
'06Conceivably,they might not like all the consequences and so opt out of the
temporal horizon of biblical thought and settle for the ready-to-use "middle" of the
road, dipolar (time-timeless) horizon of neoclassical process philosophy.
''See Fernando Canale, "Evangelical Theology and Open Theism:Toward a Biblical
Understanding of Macro HerrneneuticalPrinciples ofTheology?"JATS 12/2 (2001):16-34.
'OBFora detailed discussion of the ontological import of Exod 3 and its historical
understanding of God's being, see Canale, A Cn'tin'sm ofTheologica~Rearon,chap. 3.
'OgPinnock states: 'These two ideals, the Hellenic and the biblical, cannot really be
fused successfully.A decision needs to be made whether to go with one or the other, with
the philosophers or with God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ" (Most MovedMover, 7).

only God, but also the entire range of Christian theology.
Next to the understandmg of God, the interpretation of human nature
plays a most influential macro-hermeneutical role in Christian theology (see
above). Classical and modem theologes understand human nature in relation
to the timeless soul.110When considering Christian doctrines, it is surprising to
find out how much they owe to the classical preunderstanding about human
nature as timeless soul. Yet, from the perspective of its temporal understanding
of God, Scripture sees human beings as also being temporal entities that relate
to God historically."' Therefore, thinlung from within the historical horizon of
biblical macro-hermeneutics,we should also rediscover the temporal-historical
understanding of human nature present in Scripture and use it as our macroherrneneutical presupposition.
Deconstruction should start by deconstructing the classical timeless
understanding of God, around which the evangelical system of theology
revolves. The biblical understanding of God and time is the first step in the
long and complex path of deconstructing the many systems Christian
theologians have created through the centuries.*12Here we can only warn the
reader not to understand the meaning of God's temporality from classical
macro-hermeneutical principles, from philosophical or scientific studies, or to
identify it with human temporality.lI3Our understandingof divine temporahty
can only be secured by glimpsing into the mystery of God's being as revealed
in the pages of Scripture.
"'In classical theology, God's timelessness and the timelessness of the human soul
are different. Whereas God has timelessness in its higher and most perfect
manifestation, the soul only participates in it at a lower level corresponding to its
frnitude and relation to the body.
"'Briefly put, Scripture does not teach the immortality of the soul, which is also
an ontologicalidea exported from Greek philosophy into Christian macro hermeneutics
and popular belief. As an introduction to this issue, see Oscar Cullrnann, Immortality of
the Soul or Resurrection ofthe Dead? The Witness ofthe New Teztament (New York: MacmiUan,
19%); and Samuele Bacchiocchi, Immortalty or Resurrection? A Biblical Stdy on Human
Nature and Destitp (Berrien Springs: Biblical Perspectives, 1997).
"2Cullmann states: "How much the thinking of our days roots in Hellenism, and
how little in Biblical Christianity, becomes dear to us when we c o n f m the fact that far
and wide the Christian Church and Christian Theology distinguish time and eternity in
the Platonic-Greek manner" (Christ and Time, 61). Two sentences earlier, Cullrnann
explained that "for Plato, eternity is not endlessly extended time, but something quite
different; it is timelessness."
"3Philosophical reflection on time is interesting, but certainly not binding in
Christian theology. For an introduction to the philosophical discussion on the nature
of time, see, e.g., William J. Hill, Seafchfor the Ab.rent God Tradition and Modemi9 in
Religious Understanding (New York: Crossroad, 1992); William Hasker, God, Tim, and
Knodedge, Comell Studies in the Philosophy of R e b o n (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1998); and William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Explbring God's Rehtionsbg to
Time (Wheaton: Crossway, 2001).

Yet, even without a comprehensive study of divine temporality as revealed
in Scripture, we can decide to approach the theological task from the temporal
horizon assumed by biblical writers. In so doing, we should exercise care not
to conceive that God is limited by time as his creatures are. From the testimony
of Scripture, it becomes clear that God's time is not to be conceived as being
identical to created time (~nivocal),"~or as totally different from it
(equivocal),115but as analogical to our time. This means, for instance, that only
God experiences the fullness of time, while we experience it only partially. In
comparison with our limited experience of time, God's time appears as
"supratemporal," not in the sense that the "supra" should be understood as
timeless, but rather, as the fullness of time that only belongs to the mystery of
God's being. What is important here is not the development of a detailed
ontological model of divine temporality, but that God can experience the
temporal succession of future-present-pastboth in the deepness of h s divinity
and at the limited level of his ~reation."~
In other words, the biblical God
experiences in his "eternal" being temporal succession. Without change in his
ontological constitutionor loss to his perfection, God is able to experience time
and do new things not only "for us," but also for himself as, for instance, took
place during the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The
deconstructive effects of the biblical-temporalhorizon applied to the being and
actions of God have powerful, all-inclusive deconstructive effects, including
not only our understanding of God, but also of his salvific work in history.
"This seems to be the general notion behind process philosophy and the open
view of God.
115~mmanuel
Levinas argued this position philosophically (Totah9and Injinig: A n
E s ~ on
g Extetiotify, trans. Alphonso Lingis [Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press,
19691, 33-40); it seems that Karl Barth also implicitly assumed an equivocal notion of
divine temporality, because he simultaneously affirms that God has time and history
and understands eternity in the classical timeless way. O n divine eternity, Barth states
that "the being is eternal in whose duration beginning, succession and end are not three
but one, not separate as a first, a second and a third occasion, but one simultaneous
occasion as beginning, middle and end. Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle
and end, and to that extent it is pure duration. Eternity is God in the sense in which in
himself and in all things God is simultaneous, ie., beginning and middle as well as end,
without separation, distance or contradiction. Eternity is not, therefore, time, although
time is certainly God's creation or more correctly, a form of His creation. Time is
distinguished from eternity by the fact that in it bepning, middle and end are distinct
and even opposed as past, present and future" (Chrch Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley
and T. F. Torrance, 13 vols. [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 19361, II/1,608).
"Terence E. Fretheim states: "This common language of planning assumes that
temporal sequence is important for God-past, present, and future are meaningful
categories. There is temporal succession, a before and after, in the divine thinking.
Temporally, God is internally related to the world, that is from within its structure of
time, and in such a way that there are now no other options for God" (The Suteting of
God: An Old Testament Perspectiue, ed. Walter Brueggemann, Overtures to Biblical
Theology [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984],41).

Deconstruction, then, works not as a criticism of the Bible from
postmodem assumptions, but as a criticism of classical, modem, and
postmodern theological constructions from the Bible. Deconstruction starts by
shifting the macro-hermeneutical horizon from philosophical timelessness to
Scripture's temporality. From there, theologians should define, in faithfulness
to biblical teachings, the necessary macro-, meso-, and micro-hermeneutical
principles and, under their guidance, construct and formulate the entire body
of Christian theology.

Scripture as Groundfor Deconstmction
Obviously, to apply deconstruction to one's own theological system is difficult
and painful. However, one should keep in mind that the objective of
deconstruction is not to destroy Christian theology, but to open the way for a
more faithful understanding of divine biblical revelation. As critical
methodology, deconstruction helps us to go back to the foundation upon
which tradltion claims to build Christian and evangelical theologies. In
philosophical studies, Heidegger used deconstruction to get back to the "things
themselves" and from a temporal horizon to construct a new philosophical
understanding on them.l17In this way, one realizes that postmodernity does not
involve an absolute, unbridled relativism, but a call for a new understanding of
objectivity to be worked out from the new macro-hermeneutical horizon of
time."' The aim and soul of deconstruction, then, resides in the new
construction its application facilitate^."^
A new construction will not be possible if, after deconstructing the Grand
Tradition, we do not find the " h g s themselves." Yet, what are the "things
themselves" in theology?James Smith seems to suggest that in theology the
"dungs themselves" are God, and the Spirit understood as "Word without
words."'20This view reveals the Pentecostal tradition to which Smith belongs.
According to this tradltion, we experience God's presence, the "thing itself,"
directly in our inner being. This idea stands very close to the evangelical
experience of the "gospel" or justification by faith as understood by Luther.12'
Identifymg the "things themselves" with God's presence as "Word without
"'Heidegger, Being and Time, 11, §7,49-50.
"With the help of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Dooyeweerd, Smith, 169-175,
convincingly argues this point.
"This corresponds to the "messianic" aspect in Derrida's deconstruction.
''OSrnith, 180.
'"Martin Luther, WotdandSmament, Luther's Works, vol. 35, ed.Jaroslav Pelikan,
Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann @?hiladelphia:Fortress, 1999],119-123.E.
Theodore Bachrnann states: "According to Luther's understanding, the Word of God
is not simply to be equated with the written text of the Scriptures, for it goes much
deeper than historical description or moral precept. Rather, it is a uniquely lifeimparting power, a message communicated by men in whom the Scriptures had become
alive" ("Introduction," in Word and Sacrament, LW, 35:l-2).

words" allows Smith to argue his point, namely, to make room for diversity of
interpretation in the theological community.122However, in the field of
theological knowledge only Scriptute as divine revelation can provide the "things
themselves." Gadamer helps us to see this when he applies the Heideggerian
notion of "things themselves" also to texts.'23Even Smith seems to assume that
the only cognitive public source of data we have from which to build Christian
theology is biblical reve1ati0n.I~~
After all, scriptural teachugs made Luther's
deconstruction possible. Without Scripture, a theological deconstruction of the
herrneneutical principles of theology would be impossible.
Deconstmcting Christian Hermene~tics
While theoretically affirming the soh S+waprinciple, evangelicaltheology has
been constructed from hermeneutical principles of phdosophical origin.
Deconstruction,therefore,must start by analyzingthe herrneneuticalprinciples
operative in theologd and creedal tradition^.'^^ At this level, the aim of
deconstructionis to identify macro-hermeneuticalprinciples based on classical
ontology and to replace them with biblical teachings on the beings of God,
humans, and the world. This will give concrete content to the macrohermeneutical shift from timelessness to temporality and put an end to almost
two mdlennia of hermeneutical bondage to philo~oph~.'~"

123Gadamer,Tnrth and Method, 267.
124Smith,180.
12'McGrath, 149, encourages theologians to apply a hermeneutics of suspicion to
tradition. We should "be on our guard and understand why we believe certain things
rather than just accepting them passively from those we recognize as masters and
teachers. Tradition is something that is to be actively and selectively appropriated, not
passively and unthinkingly received." McGrath, 153, argues that Calvin also shared a
critical approach to tradition. Deconstruction as I am presenting it here is the
methodological formalization of the hermeneutics of suspicion that McGrath and
Calvin speak about; yet, I doubt they would be willing to apply it at the hermeneutical
level and to the extent I am suggesting in this. article.
'26Though Kevin J. Vanhoozer, in his recent "The Voice and the Actor: A Dramatic
Proposal about the Ministry and Minstrelsy of Theology," in Evangehcaf Futurees: A
Conversation on Theohgi'cafMethod,ed. John G. Stackhouse [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000],61106),does not deal with the issue of hermeneutics or deconstruction as I do here. Instead,
he calls for the leading role of Scripture in determiningthe macro-hermeneutical principles
of theology. He writes: "I have come to believe that, with regard to method, we have to
construe or configure three factors together: God, Scripture, andthe nature of theology. We
have to enter into a biblical-theological variant of the hermeneutic circle. Decisions taken
here affect what we might call, after the philosophers, 'first theology7-the principles that,
methodologically speaking, come first" (74). Of course, as I have argued above, there are
more principles involved in what Vanhoozer correctly calls "first theology" and I call
"macro-hermeneutical principles." The important point is that, as an evangelical
theologian, he recognizes the grounding role of Scripture in hermeneutics.
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To say that Scripture provides the " h g s themselves" means that they will
guide us in the deconstructive process of received theological traditions, as well
as in the new deconstruction-constructionthey make possible. When we apply the
deconstruction-construction method to the rnacro-herrneneutical principles of
theology, we have taken the &st methodological step in the deconstructive path.
We have thereby replaced the onto-theo-logical order of classical theology with
a new theo-onto-logical order that is faithful to Scripture.ln This means that we
will no longer define our macro-hermeneutical principles philosophically. On the
new order, we will define them theologically by adoptlng those principles
operative in biblical thlnlung. Methodologically, then, deconstruction starts by
securingthe hermeneutical independence of Christian theology from philosophy.

Implicit in the deconstruction of the hermeneutical principles of evangelical
theology is the deconstruction of its sources. For convenience,I am dealing with
the question of sources under the 'Wesleyan Quadrilateral" designation. In this
section, the historical origin of the 'Wesleyan Quadrilateral" label within the
Methodist tradition is not important. Here we are interested in the question of
sources this label evokes. Broadly spealung, Christian theologians use all sources
useful to their purposes. The Wesleyan Quadrilateral designation helps us to
classify the sources into four general types, namely, Scripture, tradition, reason,
and experience. Different traditions use these sources with different emphases.
Evangelical theology is perhaps the tradition that gves greater prominence to
Scripture. However, claiming prominence for Scripture w i t h the plurality of
sources implicit in the Wesleyan Quaddaterial does not call for the sob Srripttlra,
but for theprima Snipttlra,principle.'28Pkma Snipturagives theoreticalprominence
12'For a more detailed explanation of this foundational methodological shift, see
Canale, A Cn'tin'sm of TheologicaiReason, 285-297.
12Thisis made dear by Woodrow W. Whidden, who deals with the Wesleyan
Quadrilateralwithin the limited context of the Methodist and American Fundamentalism.
He incorrectly considers the soh Smptura principle as the cause for the "bewildering array
of doctrinal options that have arisen among the groups that strenuously profess fidelity to
the Bible as their sole authority" rSoh Snjbtwa, Inerrantist Fundamentalism and the
Wesleyan Quadrilateral:Is N o Creed but the Bible' a WorkableSolutionY' AUSS 35 [I9971:
214). Among the various possible causes for theological diversity not all are theological.
Cultural, temperamental, psychological, and ecdesiologicalreasons are always involved in
theological disagreements. Theologcally spealung, however, Whidden, 219, correctly
recognizes that American fundamentalismdid not follow through with its theoretical dairn
of abiding by the soh S@tura principle. If this is so, then, variety in American
fundamentalismmight be traced back to its macro-hermeneuticalprinciples unconsaously
derived,via tradition, from Greek philosophy.Whidden seems to forget that, as theological
source, "reason" involves more than a rationalistic apologetical procedure to tight
Enlightenmentrationalism on its own turf. Reason also indudes ontologicalinterpretations,
which, sooner or later, become the real hermeneutical guides, which Whidden certainly
would not consciously allow in his theology. However, by arguing in favor of the Wesleyan

to Scripture among other recognized sources theologians may use to
communicate the "message of salvation." By using the prima SmPtwa formula,
theologians recognize the normative role of Scripture, but simultaneously accept
and justify the existence Eandcontribution of other sources of theology. The
problem is that before the message can be "communicated," it must be
constructed. The fact that what has come to be called "the gospel" (the message
of salvation) is also a theological construction is often neglected by evangelical
theologians. Thus many of them speak about the "message" or the "gospel" as
if existing in a privileged, experiential level beyond hermeneutics and theological
construction. As a result, the way in whch the plurality of sources has shaped the
traditional understandmg of the "message of salvation" remains hidden and
removed from theologcal analysis.
The quadrilateral approach to theological sources justifies the use of sources
other than Scripture for theologicalpurposes. In so doing, it facllitates the classical
and modem convictionthat we may draw the macro-hermeneutical principles for
doing theology from philosophy and science. By afhrming the soh SmPtura
principle, the deconstructionprogram I am proposingrequires the deconstruction
of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral of Sources approach. This is necessary to ground
the macro hermeneutics of evangelical theology in Scripture and not in tradition
or philosophy. This leads away from Oden's and Grenz's proposals to overcome
the postmodern challenge by drawing our hermeneutics from past or present
traditions. It also leads away from classical and modem theological approaches,
which freely derived their hermeneutical guidance from philosophy and science.
To affirm that Scripture is God's specific revelation and simultaneously
insist that the hermeneutical principles to understand it should be drawn from
hypothetical philosophical and scientificinterpretations of reality is incoherent.
Besides, it does violence to the basic scientific principle in which we should let
things speak for themselves. If God has revealed himself in Scripture, why
should we draw our macro-hermeneutical principles from philosophy or
science? That Christian theology has been constructed on this basis does not
make it mandatory for us to continue doing it in the same way. Instead, it
shows us the need for deconstructing traditional theological systems in order
to facilitate the construction of evangelical theology from biblical macrohermeneutical principles. To define the macro-hermeneutical principles of
evangelical theology from Scripture is more coherent and convincing than to
persist in deriving them from always-changing philosophcal and scientific
opinions. Of course, the deconstruction of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral will also
Quadrilateraland theprimaS";Pturaprinciple, he is arguing in favor of the multiple-source
approach Protestant theology inherited from Roman Catholic theology. Facing the added
challenge of postmodernity, which Whidden does not considerin his article, the way out of
negative diversity in Christian theology is not the affirmation of the sob Sctiptufaprinciple,
but its use as ground and instrument to deconstruct-constructevangelical theology. Kevin
Vanhoozer correctly underlines the existence of positive theological diversity (The Voiceand
the Actor, 78-79). Because we receive both intermingled as theological traditions,
deconstruction becomes a necessary methodological step in Christian theology.

involve the deconstruction-construction of the revelation-inspiration of
Scripture.ln I have dealt with this foundational issue in another publication.lM
Deconstncction and Bibbcal Theology

Under the hermeneuticalguidance of Greek philosophy, Christian theology has
been constructed mainly as systematic theology. Biblical theology is a relatively
recent theological discipline. Though its antecedents can be traced back to the
Protestant Reformation, it only became an independent theological discipline
In its opposition to dogmatic
around the middle of the eighteenth cent~ry.'~'
theology,132the deconstructive bent of biblical theology became most apparent
since its inception. However, due to its dependence on classical and modern
macro-hemeneuticalprinciples, some proposals made by biblical theology have
been, unfortunately, negative.
The deconstructive-constructiveprogram that I am suggesting in this article
is closely related to biblical theology and relates to it in two main ways. First, it
calls for the deconstruction of the historical-critical method of biblical
interpretation. We should apply deconstruction to the hermeneutical and
methodological foundations from which biblical theologians have retrieved the
meaning of the biblical text. The methodology broadly used during the twentieth
century is known as the historical-critical method of biblical interpretati~n.'~'
12Whidden, 219-221, correctly reacts against the evangelical doctrine of verbal
inspiration, inerrancy, and the wooden rationalistic hermeneutics that flows from it.
However, the solution is not to maintain, via tradition (one source in the quadrilateral),
the classical doctrine of verbal inspiration and inerrancy in hopes of "balancing" it with
other sources in the quadrilateral. Rather, by affirming the soh Scnptura principle,
traditional views on revelation-inspiration should be deconstructed and a new model
faithful to Scripture's macro-hermeneutical principles constructed.
13'Canale, Back to Revehtion-inspiration.
13'G. Ebeling traces back the origin of biblical theology to the publication of
Gedanken von &r Besch@enbeit und &m Vorpg &r bibksch-dogmatischen Theologie vor &r alten
und neuen schohtischen(1758), by Anton Friedrich Biisching (Word andFath, trans. James
W . Leitch [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1963],87). Gerhard Hasel gives a sltghtly earlier date
for the independence of biblical theology from dogmatics: "As early as 1745 'Biblical
theology' is clearly separated from dogmatic (systematic) theology and the former is
conceived of as being the foundation of the latter" (OM Testament Theolbgy: Bm'c I~sues
in the Current Debate, rev. ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19751, 18).
'32Accordingto Ebeling, 87, biblical theology became "a rival of the prevailing
dogmatics [scholastictheology]." With Johann Philipp Gabler's 1787 presentation, biblical
theology "set itself up as a completely independent study, namely, as a critical historical
discipline alongside dogmatics" (ibid., 88). See also Anthony C. Thiselton, "E3iblical
Theology and Hermeneutics," in The Mo&rn Theoh&m:An Intmduction to Christian Tbeohgy
in the Twentieth Century, ed. David F. Ford (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997), 520.
IJ3Froma methodological viewpoint, the best introduction to the historical-critical
method that I know is by Steven McKenzie and Stephen Haynes, eds., To Each Its O m
Meaning:A n Introductionto BibkcalCritin'smand TheirAppkcation (Louisville: WestminsterJohn

Though this method has already been criticized by biblical theologians, the
deconstructionand replacement of its classical and modem macro-hermeneutical
principles has not yet been accorn~lished.'~
In other words, the historical-critical
method cannot be assumed or utilized in the task of deconstructing evangelical
theology because it works from classical and modem macro-hermeneutical
principles, which must be deconstructed from Scripture. As a result, the
application of the historical-critical method produces the deconstruction and
ensuing destructionof biblical thought. Second,once the historical-criticalmethod
has been deconstructed and replaced by a methodology based on biblical macrohermeneutical principles, biblical theology becomes an indispensable ally in the
deconstruction-construction of the various tradtional theological systems and
practices currently operative in Christianity.
Conclusion
I hope the brief outline presented in h s article suffices to show the need and
possibility of a deconstruction of evangelical theology. The need arises from the
method and the hermeneutical presuppositions involved in its construction.That
is to say, the need for a deconstructive step in theological method stems from the
fact that evangelicaltheology has been constructedby using macro-hermeneutical
presuppositions inherited from tradition and interpreted from the timeless
horizon dctated by the Greek understanding of Being (Parrnenides-PlatoAristotle).This interpretation stands in direct opposition to the temporal horizon
of biblical thought.The possibility of theological deconstructionsprings from the
"things themselves" provided to theologians by biblical revelation. Thus, in
evangelical theology, deconstruction becomes the necessary instrument to
facilitate the Reformation's adage, eccksiarefmata senrpet.mfomandze d ' (a reformed
church is to be ever reforming). In our case, "tbeohgia refmata seqer refomandz
est."13'
Understanding biblical dunking from the horizon of time becomes the
source of all deconstruction and the basis of all new construction under the
methodological guldance of the sola, tota, and prima Scriptura principles.
Knox, 1999). The historical-critical method has been criticized, among others, in the
following works: Gerhard Maier, The End offhe Hidorical CriticalMethod, trans. Edwin W.
Leverenze and Rudolph F. Norden (St. Louis: Concordia, 1977). Eta Linnemann, Hirtorical
Critn'm cffhe Bibk: Mefhohhgyor Ideohgy, trans. Robert W. Yarbrough (Grand Rapids: Baker,
1990); and idem, Bibkcal Criticism on Triak How Scienf$c i r "Sn'entric Theohgy," trans. Robert
Yarbrough (Kregel, 1998).

"'TOsee that every method necessarily involvesdefinitions and application of macrohermeneutical principles, see Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology?"
I3'George Vandervelde states:'Without a dear affirmationof the Scriptureas supreme
criterion, there is no defense against tradition becoming more than interpretive, more than
receptive. Without the over-against of the Scriptures the church has no adequate antidote
to the illusion that it is exempt from the call of setr;rperrefomand' ("Scripture and Tradition
in the Roman Catholic Church," E~angebcalReview
of the oh^ l9/2 [I9951: 144-156).

Deconstruction starts from the macro- meso-, and micro-hermeneutical
principles and extends to revelation-inspiration, methodological issues, and the
entire scope of the theology and practices of the church.
When deconstruction is not applied to Scripture, but f i m Scripture to
traditionallyreceived and accepted beliefs and practices, deconstruction becomes
not a postmodem enemy, but an ally. In so doing, we become aware that we
should no longer ground our hermeneutical principles from tradition, philosophy,
or science. Instead, we become involved in the task of dehnulg them fiom
Scripture. Though criticalof tradition, deconstruction does not imply its wholesale
destruction. On the contrary, it guides us in a criticalretrieval of those aspects that
refuse to conform to the timeless horizon of Greek ontology. In other words, it
helps to recover what reflects theological understanding constructed from the
temporal-historical horizon of biblical macro hermeneutics.
The task ahead is monumental. Centuries of theological construction must
be carefully understood and evaluated from the biblical-temporal horizon
w i h which God's being and actions were understood and described by O T
and NT writers. No single person can accomplish such a task. All theologians
and disciplines should join in by incorporating deconstruction as a necessary
step in the task of doing theology, as a step in the study of theological
prolegomena or meta-theologd issues.
Deconstruction is a painful task because, through critical analysis faithful
to Scripture, it modifies and even rejects long-held and cherished ideas. Yet
obedience to Christ, the great theological deconstructionst, and the
deconstructionistexamples of Luther and Calvin should encourage us to press
on to complete the unfulished task with renewed determination. In so doing,
we will be following Christ's command to build our life on the rock of his
words we receive in Scripture (OT and NT) (Matt 7:24).Simultaneously,we will
be overcoming the challenge of postmodernity not only in postmodern terms,
but also in faithfulness to the evangelical commitment to Scripture's revelation.

